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Fisheries co-management is an increasingly globalized concept, and a cornerstone of the Voluntary Guidelines
for Securing Sustainable Small-scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication,
adopted by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization member states in 2014. Timor-Leste is a
politically young country in the relatively rare position of having underexploited fisheries in some areas that
can be leveraged to improve coastal livelihood outcomes and food and nutrition security. The collaborative
and decentralized characteristics of co-management appeal to policymakers in Timor-Leste with provisions
for co-management and customary laws applied to resource use were incorporated into state law in 2004 and
again reinforced in 2012 revisions. The first fisheries co-management pilots have commenced where
management arrangements have been codified through tara bandu, a process of setting local laws built around
ritual practice that prohibits nominated activities under threat of spiritual and material sanctions. To date,
however, there has been little critical evaluation of the suitability or potential effectiveness of co-management
or tara bandu in the Timor- Leste fisheries context. To address this gap, we adapted the interactive governance
framework to review the ecological, social and governance characteristics of Timor- Leste's fisheries to explore
whether co-management offers a valid and viable resource governance model. We present two co-
management case studies and examine how they were established, who was involved, the local institutional
structures, and the fisheries governance challenges they sought to address.
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Fisheries co-management is an increasingly globalized concept, and a cornerstone of
the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-scale Fisheries in the Context
of Food Security and Poverty Eradication, adopted by the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization member states in 2014. Timor-Leste is a politically young
country in the relatively rare position of having underexploited fisheries in some areas
that can be leveraged to improve coastal livelihood outcomes and food and nutrition
security. The collaborative and decentralized characteristics of co-management appeal
to policymakers in Timor-Leste with provisions for co-management and customary laws
applied to resource use were incorporated into state law in 2004 and again reinforced
in 2012 revisions. The first fisheries co-management pilots have commenced where
management arrangements have been codified through tara bandu, a process of setting
local laws built around ritual practice that prohibits nominated activities under threat of
spiritual and material sanctions. To date, however, there has been little critical evaluation
of the suitability or potential effectiveness of co-management or tara bandu in the Timor-
Leste fisheries context. To address this gap, we adapted the interactive governance
framework to review the ecological, social and governance characteristics of Timor-
Leste’s fisheries to explore whether co-management offers a valid and viable resource
governance model. We present two co-management case studies and examine how
they were established, who was involved, the local institutional structures, and the
fisheries governance challenges they sought to address. Despite their relative proximity,
the two sites contrasted in local ecology and fishery type; community institutions were
starkly different but equally strong; and one site had tangible economic benefits to justify
compliance, where the other had marginal and anecdotal fishery gains. In our review of
the broader governance landscape in Timor-Leste, we see co-management as a useful
mechanism to govern small-scale fisheries, but there is a need to connect legitimized
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local institutions with hierarchical governance of higher and external influences. Initial
successes with implementing tara bandu incorporating a small marine closure have
stimulated other communities to implement no-take zones – one universally popular but
very limited interpretation of co-management. However, we highlight the need for a set
of guiding principles to ensure legitimate community engagement, and avoid external
appropriation that may reinforce marginalization of certain user groups or customary
power hierarchies.
Keywords: customary marine tenure, tradition, community-based resource management, governance, legal
pluralism
INTRODUCTION
The Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-
scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty
Eradication (SSF Guidelines), developed to complement the
1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, were
approved by the Committee of Fisheries of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) in 2014. This
commitment provides unprecedented recognition of small-
scale fisheries (SSF), which account for almost half of global
fish landings utilized for domestic human consumption (FAO,
2018), and employ over 90% of the world’s estimated 120
million fish workers (World Bank, 2012). The SSF Guidelines
were developed in response to the increasing vulnerability of
the economic, food security and nutritional benefits accrued
from small-scale fisheries, particularly for many of the world’s
poorest and most marginalized people. The SSF Guidelines
provide a range of high-level, but voluntary, commitments
relating to human rights, fisher representation, economic and
social development and sustainability. The challenge faced by
countries now is the implementation of the SSF Guidelines,
by way of aligning, adapting, reconfiguring and strengthening
existing small-scale fisheries governance and management
arrangements (Jentoft, 2014). This is particularly challenging in
low-income countries where small-scale, multispecies fisheries
are highly susceptible to governance and management failures
(Gutiérrez et al., 2011).
Co-management has captured global attention as the most
appropriate mechanism to manage tropical SSF. Fisheries
co-management is defined as a relationship between a
resource-user group (e.g., local fishers) and another entity
(e.g., government agency or non-government organization)
in which management responsibilities and authority are
shared (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Evans et al., 2011). The
philosophy behind co-management is that those who are
affected by management (e.g., fishers and other resource
users) should be involved in making management decisions
(Berkes, 2009), thereby improving the legitimacy of the state
involvement in fisheries management through more inclusive
and transparent decision-making processes (Evans et al.,
2011). Co-management is well aligned to the commitments of
participation, representation, collaboration and coordination
(Evans et al., 2011; Wamukota et al., 2012) emphasized in the
SSF Guidelines (Cohen et al., 2017). But, below these high-level
principles are highly conWorld Banktextualized grounded
actions to effectively implement co-management in complex SSF
systems (Young et al., 2018).
The degree to which responsibility is shared, and the form
and function of co-management, varies by setting, depending
on the nature of the fisheries, informal and formal governance
institutions, and the capacity, influence and authority of nation-
states and fishing communities (Sen and Nielsen, 1996). Much
has been written about the evolution, role and performance
of co-management in varying contexts in the Pacific island
countries and territories (e.g., Govan, 2009; Davis and Ruddle,
2012; Jupiter et al., 2014; Klein et al., 2014) and in the Coral
Triangle (e.g., Dirhamsyah, 2013; Cohen and Steenbergen, 2015).
Whilst Timor-Leste falls within the Coral Triangle Region, its
political and cultural history provides a new set of challenges and
a valuable platform for learning.
This study represents the first account of co-management
for Timor-Leste’s SSF and our first objective is to describe the
emergence and form that co-management has taken. Our second
objective is to provide some critical reflections on the role of
diverse actors and institutions in the implementation process,
the sustainability of interventions, and the ongoing resourcing
of SSF management in a developing country setting. By drawing
on the interactive governance framework (sensu Chuenpagdee
and Jentoft, 2013) we examine how the characteristics of
small-scale fisheries (i.e., system-to-be-governed), in these two
cases and in Timor-Leste more broadly, render them more or
less governable using a co-management approach (governing
system). We aim to unpack some of the particular challenges
and opportunities that co-management might offer up as a
principle vehicle with which to govern SSF in Timor-Leste and
similar contexts.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The Interactive Governance Framework (Chuenpagdee and
Jentoft, 2013) breaks down the analysis of SSF into three
main components: (1) System to be Governed, (2) Governing
System, and (3) Governance Interactions. To describe the
system-to-be-governed we briefly review both published and
unpublished literature on Timor-Leste’s SSF in terms of types
and level of participation, the geographic range and focus of
fleets, species targeted, and fishing gears employed. Second,
to examine the governing system, we draw on previous
reviews of the formal legal and policy instruments that have
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enabled, or could potentially enable, state and municipal and
village (Suco) levels of government to play a role in SSF
governance. We also review published reports that explain
how customary institutions have been proposed or invoked
in community efforts to manage natural resources. Finally, we
examine governance interactions to summarize the main co-
management developments in Timor-Leste over the last two
decades. We then delve into two cases where community-
based forms of co-management have been implemented with
support from external agencies. Data for these cases are
drawn from published literature, and also from the first-
hand experiences of authors who were facilitators in the co-
management establishment processes in 2012 and 2015. These
communities were revisited in late 2016 and again in early
2018 to evaluate how these approaches have fared in recent
years. These visits used key informant interviews with fishers,
traders and local leaders, and gender disaggregated focus group
discussions (FGDs) to evaluate the longer-term effectiveness of
the co-management regimes.
For each site we report the target fishery species using
published analyses from the Timor-Leste national digital catch
monitoring system, PeskAAS (including non-boat-based fishing
landings), and utilize high resolution vessel monitoring data
to characterize the distribution of fishing pressure across space
between February 2018 and May 2019. Seven vessels in Adara
and 15 vessels in Biacou were fitted with solar-powered boat
trackers that record location every second. To classify fishing
by range and habitat in each of the case study sites, fishing
effort heat maps were created by segmenting the geography
into a grid of hexagons, parsing individual trips into segments,
categorizing these segments by activity (fishing vs. steaming vs.
parking etc.) according to activity classification algorithms, and
summing the total amount of fishing time (in hours) spent by the
fleet in each grid cell.
RESULTS
System to Be Governed
Timor-Leste makes up the eastern half of the island of Timor
and has a population of approximately 1.2 million (GOTL,
2015). It was colonized by Portugal in the sixteenth century,
and then following 9 days of independence in 1975, was
annexed by Indonesia. The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
was formed in 2002 following independence from Indonesia.
The country has an extensive exclusive economic zone of
77,051 km2 and a coastline of 706 km, which includes the
Special Administrative Region of Oecusse-Ambeno (RAEOA),
and the two islands of Atauro and Jaco (Figure 1). Following
independence, the economy grew rapidly due to offshore
oil and gas exploitation, the returns of which sit in a
sovereign wealth fund and provide ∼80% of the total budget
for Government expenditure (World Bank, 2018). However,
petroleum production is declining and few people are directly
employed in the oil industry. In addition, levels of poverty,
food insecurity and chronic malnutrition remain some of the
highest in the world (Grebmer et al., 2015). With over 80%
of the population involved primarily in subsistence or small-
scale agriculture and fisheries, and over 95% living in rural areas
(GOTL, 2015), the sustainable enhancement of this sector is
recognized as a priority pathway to building a more diverse
economy (GOTL, 2011).
Recent figures suggest there are ∼5000 fishers in Timor-
Leste (GOTL, 2015), with over 2000 of these on the island of
Atauro (Mills et al., 2017). The fisheries sector in Timor-Leste
is almost exclusively small-scale, and in this context, small-scale
fishing activities refer to those that take place on average less
than 5km from shore, targeting reef fish and small, near-surface,
open-water species such as sardines, mackerel scad, needlefish,
garfish, and flying fish (López-Angarita et al., 2019). Fishing often
serves as part of diverse livelihood strategies that simultaneously
include agriculture, foraging, small-scale business and sporadic
engagement in paid employment; each of which may become
more or less important at different times of the year (Alonso
Población, 2013; Mills et al., 2017).
The majority of boat-based fishing in Timor-Leste is done
from one and two person non-motorized wooden outrigger
canoes (82%). The remaining 18% consists of both slightly
larger canoes with “long-tail” outboards (katintin) (63%) and
larger wooden or fiberglass boats with outboard engines
(35%) (AMSAT International, 2011b; Alonso Población, 2013).
Following independence, foreign development assistance funded
the distribution of approximately 300 outboard engines and
1,500 gill-nets to coastal fishers (Sanyu Consulting, 2003),
conducted in part as a gear swap for beach seine fishing
gear, which was banned. Gear types such as hand lines, spear
guns, cast nets and monofilament gill nets, deployed from
beaches, and across reef and seagrass habitats are simple
and low-cost. Gill netting and hand-lining in and around
river plumes target seasonally occurring schools of sardines,
mackerels and scads. Seaweed farming and sea cucumber
harvesting take place on seagrass beds (Park et al., 2012),
while gleaning for molluscs, fish, crustaceans and cephalopods
is common in the intertidal zone. Gleaning represents an
important fishery livelihood undertaken predominantly by
women and children for subsistence and/or sale (Sandlund
et al., 2001; McWilliam, 2003; AMSAT International, 2011a;
Alonso et al., 2012). In terms of landed weight and contribution
to income, finfish are the most important group for fisheries
livelihoods. However, gleaned catches contribute directly to
household food and nutrition security, and to varying extent
buffer the seasonal and stochastic nature of fisheries livelihoods
(Tilley et al., in review).
Nearshore fish aggregating devices (FADs) are allowed by
law and are commonly utilized by coastal fishers to increase
access to denser schools of small pelagic fish. Fish around the
FADs are targeted using hand lines, gill nets or seine nets
known locally as chinchin and lampoon (Tilley et al., in review).
Beach seine nets were banned after independence, but their
use continues in areas where habitats are degraded or where
fisheries productivity is low. Other highly destructive methods
such as blast fishing and poisoning have all but ceased aside
from localized use of naturally occurring, organic toxins in
gleaning reef fisheries.
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FIGURE 1 | Map illustrating Timor-Leste within the Coral Triangle region (inset). The main map shows the two case study locations where forms of co-management
have been established, (a) Biacou community, and (b) Adara community located on the Island of Atauro, in relation to the capital, Dili and the Special Administrative
Region of Oecusse-Ambeno (RAEOA). The dotted line represents the EEZ.
Small-scale fisheries play a crucial role in local food and
nutrition security and livelihoods, and researchers suggest
there is potential to enhance these contributions in Timor-
Leste (Mills et al., 2013). Preliminary surveys from coral reef
fishing grounds in Timor-Leste, however, suggest that mean
fish sizes are small compared to neighboring sites in Indonesia
(McCoy et al., 2015). Fisher surveys and focus groups in fishing
communities across the north coast of Timor-Leste and Atauro
Island also suggest declines in catch volume and fish sizes
in reef fisheries, although there are no empirical time series
data available to support this. Underwater visual surveys of
reef fish biomass across Timor-Leste suggest healthy reef fish
populations (López-Angarita et al., 2019). Both the case study
sites examined in this paper have narrow fringing reefs, which
provide limited fisheries productivity, but the country is in
the relatively unique situation of having very lightly exploited
stocks of small pelagic fish (Alonso et al., 2012; Mills et al.,
2013). This underlines the need for fisheries management and
diversification of fisheries to exploit more sustainable pelagic
stocks, while simultaneously, addressing common concerns
remaining about sustainability of nearshore marine resources for
meeting subsistence needs, government-set nutrition goals, and
conservation commitments (Alonso et al., 2012; NDFA, 2012;
Mills et al., 2013).
Governing System
Fisheries governance in Timor-Leste involves two major
governing systems: state-based institutions developed post-
Independence, and community-specific customary institutions
that have persisted and evolved through several hundred
years of Portuguese colonialism and 25 years of Indonesian
administrative rule (Feijó, 2015). In view of this paper’s scope
we refer to state-based institutions (referred to as hierarchical
governance by the Interactive Governance Framework) and
custom-based governing institutions (referred to as self-
governance by the Interactive Governance Framework), and
how these two governing systems interact in co-governance
or co-management which is, arguably, a newer and emerging
governance system for fisheries in Timor-Leste.
State-Based Governance
Independence from Indonesia brought the need for Timor-Leste
to develop its own fisheries laws and define sector priorities,
providing the opportunity to promote a sustainable model of
fisheries management (Alonso et al., 2012; Alonso-Población
et al., 2016). Timor-Leste’s constitution stipulates that “Everyone
has the right to a humane, healthy, and ecologically balanced
environment and the duty to protect it and improve it for the
benefit of the future generations” (Article 61 n.º1). Whilst this
recognizes a shared governing responsibility, the fisheries sector
is formally (approved by Law Decree n.º14/2015, of 24 June)
the governance responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries (MAF).
Post-independence, a highly centralized governance
system has developed and a mismatch between budget,
bureaucratic processes and the requirements of municipalities
are common (World Bank, 2012). The principle of decentralized
public administration is clearly established in Timor-
Leste’s constitution (section 5), and over the past 15 years,
government administrations have developed and adopted
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various decentralized governance frameworks, although none
have yet been fully implemented (Cummins, 2015). In the
most recent iteration, the Government approved Law-Decree
n.º3/2016 (of 16 March) outlines a strategy of reform that will
ultimately see the creation of a second, locally-elected, tier of
government in each of Timor-Leste’s 12 Municipalities (the
13th region of RAEOA is already given a degree of budgetary
autonomy with Special Administrative status).
In the current structure of MAF, the Fisheries Department has
a national office based in the capital Dili, and fisheries officers
operate from MAF offices in each municipality. The national
fisheries office is responsible for the monitoring of marine
resources, collecting data and taxes on exports, administering
boat licensing, and all enforcement and compliance including
inspections of foreign licensed fishing vessels. There are 96
fisheries staff employed across 13 municipalities, some of whom
work as community-based field officers who (depending on local
levels of fishing and municipal resources available) typically
include field extension activities like recording fish landings,
training fisher and trader groups, and managing fish landing
centers. These municipality-based fisheries officers play an
important coordinating role with village and suco level leaders
(Figure 2), and will be important actors in co-management as the
link between the two hierarchies of governance, e.g., in escalating
infractions outside the jurisdiction of local authorities or vision
of co-management such as encroachment by industrial or foreign
fishing vessels. In practice, the activities of both national and
municipal fisheries departments and their influence over Timor-
Leste’s fisheries sector are limited due to low institutional, human
resource and financial capacities relative to the scale (number
of fishers and fish traders) and scope (geographic expanse)
of fisheries activities – particularly small-scale fisheries. For
example, in 2017 the fisheries received only 0.07% of the national
budget (López-Angarita et al., 2019). As stated by a MAF official,
this “is not in proportion to the number of persons employed
in rural activities, nor the number of people living with food
insecurity in rural areas” (in da Cruz, 2016). Although, the
number of staffs employed by MAF has increased substantially
since early post-independence (from 350 people in 2002 to 2196
in 2015; da Cruz, 2016), the majority of the expansion has
occurred in the agricultural sector.
Community-Based Institutions
The most relevant interpretation of “community” in Timor-Leste
would relate to the geographical distribution of people in a Suco
(village) and aldeia (hamlet), whereby several aldeias form a
Suco (consistent with Miyazawa, 2013). While the composition
of some Sucos, particularly in urban areas, has been altered due to
colonial influence and migration, these communities are based
on historical and cultural connections, linked to uma lulik or
uma lisan (traditional “house group”) relationships established
through kinship, marriage and alliance. It is suggested that lisan
(customary law) is still the main source of law and authority
for most Timorese people, particularly in rural areas (Cummins,
2015). It provides community cohesion and conflict resolution
mechanisms, informs the allocation of leadership and decision-
making power, and guides the use of communal resources
(Cummins, 2015). This combination of customary governance
FIGURE 2 | The hierarchical structure of fisheries related departments of Timor-Leste’s Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and at what levels these coordinate with
municipal, suco and village level governance under the Ministry of State Administration.
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org 5 July 2019 | Volume 6 | Article 392
fmars-06-00392 July 11, 2019 Time: 17:37 # 6
Tilley et al. Co-management in Timor-Leste
layered with state-based institutions has resulted in a current
governance system described as political hybridity or a form of
legal pluralism. It consists of two sets of institutions and laws,
from very different worldviews, which community leaders must
balance on a daily basis to ensure their decisions are legitimate
and effective in their communities (Cummins, 2015).
Suco leadership has played an important role from before
Portuguese colonization to the present. In recognition of
this, provision for the election of a Suco council in each of
Timor-Leste’s 442 Sucos was first established in 2004 (Law
nº5/2004, of 14 April), formally incorporating existing customary
practices into state-based institutions (Cummins, 2015). In
preparation for the creation of a Local Government at the
Municipality level, the recently adopted Suco Law (Law nº9/2016,
of 8 July 2016, pmbl.) refines the composition of the Suco
council and takes further steps to legally affirm the “authority
functions that are traditionally associated to [the Suco].” The
Suco council is composed of community leaders elected by
community members, as well as a lia-na’in (a customary authority
figure who holds ritual and judicial powers) (Cummins, 2015),
and encourages greater representation for women and young
people through a formalized quota system1. As outlined in
the law, Suco councils and their leaders have a broad range
of duties and responsibilities, including dissemination of state-
based laws and regulations, and the promotion, adaptation or
preservation of custom-based laws. However, actions may not be
undertaken at the detriment of the State or Municipality tiers of
government (Article 6).
Given their authority and responsibilities, Suco councils are
critical points of engagement for both government and non-
government organizations interested in carrying out community-
based activities, including the establishment of new co-
management committees or co-management arrangements for
natural resources such as fisheries (Costa Pereira et al., 2013). The
strength, priorities and perspectives of these local leaders (Suco
and Aldeia chiefs) appear to be more important for successful
resource management than an active and engaged district MAF
fisheries officer.
While it has been suggested that Timorese people have less
of a connection to the sea than other island nations (e.g., in
the Pacific), local and traditional management and relationships
with coastal resources do exist in parts of Timor-Leste. Despite
being historically ignored or excluded by the Portuguese and
Indonesian regimes, these institutions have persisted to varying
degrees (McWilliam, 2003). Tara bandu refers broadly to laws or
prohibitions (Hicks, 2004) that can be applied by communities
to regulate land use or fisheries harvest in a given area for
a set period of time (Shepherd, 2013). This may apply to,
for example, prohibiting deforestation in terrestrial ecosystems
(JICA, 2015), establishing temporal fishing bans in a freshwater
lake (Needham et al., 2013), and banning the harvest of certain
species or in specified coastal fishing areas (Alonso-Población
et al., 2016, 2018). These custom-based laws are closely related to
1The Council is composed by: the Suco Chief; the aldeia Chiefs of the Suco; a
female delegate from each Suco’s aldeias; a male delegate from each Suco’s aldeias;
a female youth representative from the Suco; a male youth representative from the
Suco (Article 10, Law n.º9/2016, of 8 July 2016).
cultural conceptualizations of the relationships between humans
and non-human entities, and are complied with in part due to
people’s belief that if they break the rules, they will be cursed
(Miyazawa, 2013). Tara bandu is enacted through a mix of diverse
rituals leading to a usable regulatory practice of interactions
within communities and between humans and their environment
(McWilliam et al., 2014).
In the last 10 years, non-government organizations (NGOs)
have initiated projects to re-introduce or strengthen tara bandu
in various parts of Timor-Leste. Whilst it is often framed by
NGOs as a longstanding and important tradition, tara bandu
(as with other similar customary institutions e.g., Cohen and
Steenbergen, 2015) has undergone a process of contemporary
revitalization and re-imaging since independence (McWilliam
et al., 2014; Alonso-Población et al., 2016, 2018). Observers
have suggested that the application of tara bandu in managing
natural resource use is merely appropriation of the institution
to achieve externally formulated conservation and sustainability
objectives (McWilliam et al., 2014), and its nature and presence
in between governing systems reflects the presence of a legal
pluralism (Alonso-Población et al., 2018). Nonetheless, tara
bandu appears to hold legitimacy with communities, NGOs and
government alike (see Table 1) and its invocation in community-
based resource management or co-management seems almost
inevitable. Tara bandu has played “an inherent part in the
development of local ordinances to protect the forest-watershed
areas” (MAFF, 2004, p38 in Miyazawa, 2013) and it has
been suggested that it should form the basis of community-
based fisheries management efforts (Needham et al., 2013). The
MAF “has been encouraging the revival of tara bandu for
both technical and political reasons” which are perceived as
“benefiting both governmental authority and customary leaders”
(Miyazawa, 2013).
Tara bandu is now also recognized by the state-based
Environmental Framework Law (Article 8). This law affirms that
tara bandu may be established through local common law to
conserve the environment and promote the sustainable use of
natural resources, and importantly, declares that the State will
ensure the regulated area is effectively protected. More generally,
the Constitution (Article 2 n.º4) affirms that “The State shall
recognize and value the norms and customs of East Timor that
are not contrary to the Constitution and to any legislation dealing
specifically with customary law.”
Co-management Policy Development Since
Independence
The notion that state- and community-based management
should be harmonized and interacting has had a degree of
currency since independence. The various development of
policies, regulations and programs in Timor-Leste related to
fisheries co-management are summarized as a chronological
timeline in Table 1.
Case Studies
Here we present two case studies of the development of fisheries
management systems in contrasting settings. We have selected
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TABLE 1 | A timeline of fisheries co-management developments in Timor-Leste since 2000.
What Year Who Description and co-management development Comment
“Fish for the Future” –
first national fisheries
policy
2001 MAF Focused on nascent state priorities such as staff capacity
building, assertion of jurisdiction, and development of
legislation (Alonso et al., 2012).
Co-management or
community-based,
coastal resource
management
framework
2001 MAF under the World
Bank’s second Agriculture
Rehabilitation Project
Detailed proposed community-based, coastal resource
management scheme (Stockwell, 2001, 2002).
No follow up or
implementation
(Stockwell, 2002).
Law Decree 6/2004 of
21 April – establishes
the general basis of the
legal regime for fisheries
and aquaculture
management and
regulation
2004 MAF Provides for the creation of co-management committees
with powers related inter alia to “compliance with
conservation and management measures of fishing
resources, protection of the marine environment, assistance
in controlling illegal fishing and compliance with the fisheries
legislation” (Article 114).
Currently under
review (2018).
“Fish for Sustainability:
Our Strategic Plan for
Fisheries,
2006–2011” – a new
fisheries strategy
2005 (drafted), 2007
(released)
MAF To “encourage and facilitate community-based, fisheries
management initiatives and aims at establishing a network
of local, community-supported marine protected areas and
encourage involvement of NGOs” (MAFF, 2005).
Not approved by
the Council of
Ministers, nor
legally endorsed by
the government
(Alonso et al.,
2012).
Development and
establishment of
Timor-Leste’s first
marine protected area,
Nino Konis Santana
National Park (NKSNP)
2006–2009 MAF in partnership with a
consortium of Australian
agencies
Project included a planning workshop for the NKSNP
marine component which endorsed “a community-based
approach to planning [. . .] – i.e., Locally Managed Marine
Area (LMMA) model – to build local support, stewardship
and provide for co-management” (Edyvane et al., 2009).
The adoption and
implementation
success of
management
process has not
been critically
assessed.
2009–2013 USAID’s Coral Triangle
Support Partnership,
implemented by
Conservation International
in partnership with MAF
and a local NGO
The Indonesian National LMMA Network supported
development and planning of LMMAs at Manatuto and
Hera including exchange visits, community surveys and
participatory planning in 2011–2012. Worked with
communities of the NKSNP to identify priority resources and
develop management solutions, leading to the development
of a multiple-use marine park zoning and regulatory
scheme, and community-based management plans (Weeks
et al., 2014). As part of this work, a manual was produced
on “Guidelines for Establishing Co-Management of Natural
Resources in Timor-Leste” (Costa Pereira et al., 2013).
Regional Fisheries
Livelihoods Program for
South and Southeast
Asia (RFLP) – a regional
program, implemented
in six Asia-Pacific
countries
2009–2013 Implemented by the FAO in
close collaboration with the
Timor-Leste Government,
funded by the Kingdom of
Spain.
Aimed at “strengthening capacity among participating
small-scale fishing communities and their supporting
institutions toward improved livelihoods and sustainable
fisheries resources management,” including the
establishment and strengthening of co-management
mechanisms (Needham et al., 2013). In Timor-Leste, the
RFLP focused on building basic governance systems, such
as the development of a National Fisheries Statistics
System and a National Census of Fishers and Boats,
among other activities. NDFA staff were also engaged to
gather information from communities on informal
management arrangements and governing mechanisms in
coastal areas. Through this exercise the community of
Biacou were identified as interested in re-enacting their tara
bandu for management purposes.
Further details on
the Biacou case
study are provided
below.
Participatory
development of the first
exclusively marine tara
bandu in the
community of Adara on
Atauro Island
2015–2016 Implemented by WorldFish
funded by the Australian
Center for International
Agricultural Research
A highly participatory approach involving all stakeholders in
Adara, as well as relevant government agencies.
Regulations, boundaries and fine structure were devised by
the community, including a closed area with a “reef tax” for
diving and snorkel groups wanting to enter.
Further details on
the Adara case
study are provided
below.
(Continued)
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org 7 July 2019 | Volume 6 | Article 392
fmars-06-00392 July 11, 2019 Time: 17:37 # 8
Tilley et al. Co-management in Timor-Leste
TABLE 1 | Continued
What Year Who Description and co-management development Comment
National Fisheries
Strategy
2017–2018 MAF and WorldFish funded
by Norway and the Asian
Development Bank.
Between 2017 and 2018, the DGP and WorldFish
conducted national consultations with fishers in every
municipality of Timor-Leste to inform the drafting of the
NFS. The two primary strategic actions identified were (1) to
update and harmonize the legal and regulatory frameworks
of the sector; and (2) to develop an institutional framework
conducive to participatory and transparent co-management
of marine fisheries.
López-Angarita
et al., 2019
these cases because they are the most mature examples of co-
management in the country, and authors of this paper have been
involved in the development of both cases. The first, Biacou,
is on the mainland of Timor-Leste in a pelagic-focused fishery.
The second is on Atauro Island, the most fish-dependent region
of Timor-Leste (Mills et al., 2011), where reef fisheries are
important, and supporting a developing stream of income from
eco-tourism was a high priority for the community.
Case Study 1: Biacou Community
The aldeia of Biacou is situated in Bobonaro Municipality at
the western end of Timor-Leste’s north coast (Figure 1), some
23 km from the border with West Timor, Indonesia. Road
access along the coast to Dili and inland to the Municipal
capital,Maliana, is good and brings with it significant trade
opportunities. Biacou is a hamlet of 100 households and 579
people (GOTL, 2015) and represents one of the most important
fishery landing sites of the country in terms of landed weight
per year (NDFA, 2016). Fishing is predominantly motorized with
fishing taking place as far as 25 km from Biacou (Figure 3). Catch
is dominated by small pelagic and semi-pelagic fishes such as
moonfish (Mene maculata), sardines (Sardinella spp. and others)
mackerel scad (Rastrelliger sp.) and flying fish (Cypselurus sp.)
(López-Angarita et al., 2019). No stock assessment data exist
for this area. Fishing is a major livelihood activity for most
households, although livelihood portfolios are mixed and include
agriculture, salt production and trade. The mean price for fish
was ∼USD $2.80/kg with little variation between species at the
time this study was carried out (Tilley et al., in review). In terms
of local level authority, Biacou has an aldeia chief and is part
of Suco Aidabaleten. The MAF office for Bobonaro Municipality
is located inland, in Maliana, but a fishery officer is also based
in Biacou community as a caretaker of the fisheries center
(Lote de peska).
The community of Biacou recognized that they were facing
environmental issues such as ongoing drought, deforestation and
destruction of coral reefs for lime production, so they actively
sought information and opportunities for outside help to design
and declare a tara bandu. The Regional Fisheries Livelihoods
Program for South and Southeast Asia supported the community
in formally recognizing and instituting tara bandu, and using
it as a means to strengthen marine resource management. This
was seen as an invaluable opportunity to gain insights about
implementation and longer-term enactment of principles of tara
bandu. A detailed account of the process of establishing the
tara bandu in Biacou is given by Alonso-Población et al. (2016),
who note:
“This tara bandu was not a measure imposed by the state
institutions or by development agencies, although community
leaders received external support during the process to establish
the governance arrangement. Far from being an alien measure
imposed anew, it represents an example of the revitalization of a
customary practice and a claim for the assertion of land, coastal
and marine rights, resource exploitation and management by the
local community.”
Discussion of the Biacou tara bandu began in 2010 and it
was enacted in August 2012. Discussions involved the formal
(Suco chief, aldeia chief, National Directorate for Fisheries,
and Aquaculture staff) and informal ritual authorities of the
relevant origin house groups (rai na’in kaer bua malus), along
with community members. The tara bandu rules and penalties
were written in a public document signed by community
representatives and witnesses, the places under protection were
mapped, and a tara bandu map was painted on the wall of a public
building. The final enactment of the tara bandu involved not only
the aforementioned figures but also high-level political figures
such as the Secretary of State for Fisheries and Aquaculture, who
formally recognized the community’s crucial role and authority
in governing resources.
The tara bandu rules establish restrictions over the use of
lulik (sacred, taboo) spaces, terrestrial resources (protection
of forest resources, banning slash-and-burn agriculture) and
marine resources (protecting coral, mangroves, prohibiting bomb
and poison fishing, protecting turtles, and their eggs), and
address conflict resolution (particularly between youth groups).
It involves a three-step graduated penalty system, with second
and third offenses giving rise to increasingly harsh penalties. In
line with custom-based practice, penalties involve the offender
providing food (goat, buffalo, rice), cash and other supplies
(alcohol, cigarettes, betel nuts) to the community, which are
consumed in a community feast once a reconciliation agreement
has been reached. Payment of penalties to the community occurs
after the offender admits to breaching the tara bandu rules and a
stepwise reconciliation process. It is considered in the offender’s
interest to acknowledge their breach in the tara bandu; this
rests upon the logic that by not holding the reconciliation ritual
that re-establishes the tara bandu, offenders are punished by
the spirits of the rai na’in or the ancestors, who are considered
the ones enforcing the ban. Needham et al. (2013) recount the
first enactment of the tara bandu penalties when a 100 years
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FIGURE 3 | Continuous tracking data and a fishing density heat map for 20 SSF vessels in Biacou from February 2018 to May 2019. The heat map color gradient is
continuous and reflects the proportion of total fishing effort in hours for that hexagonal area. © Pelagic Data Systems. Satellite Imagery ESRI-Leaflet 2019.
old tamarind tree burned down. After the offense occurred, a
community discussion and a conflict resolution procedure were
held – locally called nahe biti (unroll the mat) (Babo-Soares, 2004)
that involved both ritual and formal authorities, followed by a
community feast and ritual to re-establish the ban.
In late 2016, men’s and women’s FGDs and key informant
interviews with Biacou community members provided insights
into the status and effectiveness of the tara bandu. Both groups
stated that the tara bandu regulations were still effective and
strictly enforced by the aldeia chief with the support of the MAF
municipal officer at the fish landing center:
“Both men [the Chief & security guard] are regularly reminding
people of the rules” (Women’s FGD).
Others were also active in ensuring there was a broad
understanding of the rules:
“Every point listed under the tara bandu has been enforced,
and people follow them. The community, the local authorities and
the rai na’in [spiritual ancestors] are making sure the rules are
followed” (Men’s FGD).
Both groups noted that “almost all” people in the community
were happy with the application of tara bandu as it had increased
their knowledge of marine resources, and had shown good
results. Men and women from the community had integrated
the tara bandu as a new cultural norm. There had been
clear behavioral changes due to the regulations (agricultural
practice, fishing locations, mangrove cutting) all of which would
be expected to have positive dividends for the sustainability
of natural systems. While anecdotal evidence from villagers
suggested increases in vegetation on the surrounding hills,
diversity of fauna in the mangrove systems and numbers of small
fish, there are no empirical baseline data to test these assertions.
Importantly, and in contrast to the Adara case study below,
there have been no direct/immediate financial returns from
the formal declaration of the tara bandu. A key difference
between these cases is that there is no tourism in Biacou.
However, people’s participation in the declaration process, and
interview and focus group responses, suggest that they value
the formalized institution, and are convinced of its importance
in securing the community’s natural resource base. Given this,
it seems highly likely that the regulations will continue to be
active and effective into the foreseeable future. Indeed, there
was considerable motivation to extend the tara bandu to other
resources. Interestingly, on our return visit in 2018, men and
women both highlighted that a ban on using gill nets in front of
the mangrove area had had the biggest impact on their lives (both
in terms of constraints and positive outcomes). This new rule,
which was not included in the original tara bandu document of
the community due to internal controversies between community
members, reflects the adaptive nature of the tara bandu to
accommodate new management measures as the need arises. The
important role of the ritual authorities and mostly the Aldeia
chief in socializing rules and enforcing the tara bandu was very
clear, and continued success may be dependent on this strong and
engaged leadership.
Case Study 2: Adara Community
The aldeia of Adara is located on the west coast of the island
of Atauro (Figure 1). Adara is a hamlet of 98 households
and 452 inhabitants (GOTL, 2015), and is accessible only by
sea or by rough walking tracks across the island’s central
uplands. The steep topography inland of Adara and limited
rainfall reduce horticultural activities to small hold farming.
These conditions and year-round favorable seas have brought
about a high dependence on fisheries livelihoods (Mills et al.,
2017) that goes back many generations (Magalhaes, 1918; Barros
Duarte, 1984). Yet, even self-identified fishers in Atauro pursue
multiple livelihoods, complimenting fishing with limited crop
and livestock farming or small businesses (Mills et al., 2017).
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org 9 July 2019 | Volume 6 | Article 392
fmars-06-00392 July 11, 2019 Time: 17:37 # 10
Tilley et al. Co-management in Timor-Leste
Livestock represents an important savings and investment
mechanism, whereby any additional money accrued by the
households from various livelihoods, will be invested in
purchasing animals (AMSAT International, 2011a). The shallow
water gill nets and close range spear guns utilized in Adara limit
exploitation mainly to reef areas within 5 km range from the
landing site (Figure 4). Reports from local fishers that catch rates
have been declining in recent years are difficult to corroborate.
Mean reef fish biomass of 2,207.8 kg/ha was the highest among
five sites surveyed using underwater visual surveys in 2017 and
2018 (López-Angarita et al., 2019), which lies well above the
range of reef fish biomass estimates from unfished reefs in
the Indian Ocean (500–1800 kg/ha) (Graham and McClanahan,
2013) and is more than an order of magnitude higher than
biomass seen on heavily fished reefs (MacNeil et al., 2015).
Fishing is concentrated in the thin fringing reef areas and on
the reef edge, and the catch assemblage is dominated by the
small pelagic Carangidae (mackerels and scads) and reef dwelling
fusiliers (Caesionidae) and soldierfishes (Holocentridae) (López-
Angarita et al., 2019). The mean price for fish was ∼USD $1.81/kg
with little variation between species at the time this research was
carried out (Tilley et al., in review).
Despite its isolation, Adara is now a relatively popular dive
and eco-tourism destination. Tourism efforts began in 1994 when
simple beach cabanas were built by an Indonesian company,
but only one or two tourists reportedly ever came. In the late
1990s and early 2000s, tourists in search of calmer snorkeling
and diving beaches during the wet season started investigating
Adara by walking overland from Usubemaco (the main dock
of Atauro, where boats from Dili arrive). In 2010 and 2013
simple cabanas were constructed by a private tour operator
and community members, respectively. However, tourism did
not increase significantly until 2013, following the release of a
documentary about Adara (Alonso-Población et al., 2016), and
the establishment of direct boat routes from Dili.
Considering the high vulnerability associated with specialized
livelihoods, compounded by the perceived declines of reef
resources and fisheries, Adara undertook a process to introduce
community based resource management (CBRM). In 2013, the
international research organization WorldFish began supporting
the Adara community to develop fishery management plans and
establish a locally managed marine area (LMMA) (Mills and
Tilley, 2017); at the community’s request, this was based on the
tara bandu mechanism. Consultative processes were facilitated
by the aldeia chief and overseen by a committee of men and
women appointed by the Chief. As in the Biacou case study, a
set of rules were drawn up to govern resource extraction across
the entire area considered to be community fishing grounds,
and a 0.04 km2 area of reef directly in front of the community
was permanently closed to all extractive activities. Critically, the
location of this closed area was discussed in detail and agreed
upon in women’s focus groups, as women’s gleaning activities
would be displaced by the closed area. As in the Biacou example,
rules were established that tara bandu violators would be fined a
quantity of food items, with repeat offenders subject to a doubling
and tripling of the fine quantities. The Adara community
recognized and exploited the growing interest in Adara as an off-
the-beaten-track tourist destination, and established a “reef tax”
for snorkelers and divers entering the no-fishing zone. However,
rules relating to ancestral spirits were not recognized since, in
contrast to Biacou, Adara community members predominantly
follow Protestant Christian beliefs, and traditional spirituality
FIGURE 4 | Continuous tracking data and a fishing density heat map for seven SSF vessels in Adara from February 2018 to May 2019. The heat map color gradient
is continuous and reflects the proportion of total fishing effort in hours for that hexagonal area. The red dotted line represents the closed area established in April
2016 as part of the tara bandu process. © Pelagic Data Systems. Satellite Imagery ESRI-Leaflet 2019.
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and associated institutions have all but disappeared. Instead, the
agreed rules were approved by the pastor and officially recognized
by local government departments, with maritime police and
administrative and Suco officials present at the opening ceremony
in April 2016. Reef taxes contributed by tourists are accumulated
and an elected committee of three community members
(currently led by a woman) are responsible for their safekeeping
until the community elects to publicly open the box, and vote
on its usage for communal projects. Projects initiated after the
first such ceremony were to develop the community’s piped water
infrastructure and set up a kindergarten.
When asked directly about what drove compliance to tara
bandu regulations in Adara, community members stated that
it was the church’s recognition of the process (through their
local pastor), and the tangible monetary benefit of having
tourists visit the area. Adara provided the first example of
tara bandu for marine resources on Atauro Island since before
Indonesian occupation, and can arguably claim that their success
is responsible for rekindling interest from many communities on
the island in establishing LMMAs and a tara bandu. It represents
a successful case in managing small-scale fisheries that can and
has been expanded further afield, as compliance to regulations
seems very strong with clear, direct benefits from tourism income.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Coastal fisheries systems have seen a surge in investments and
policy development toward the establishment of CBRM and
LMMA sites, particularly in the Pacific region (Govan, 2009;
Jupiter et al., 2014). However, as such systems of governance
are increasingly promoted, there is growing recognition that
coastal communities may not have the governing power to
manage fishery resources against powerful external interests (e.g.,
Bailey and Zerner, 1992), for vulnerable species or fisheries of
high economic value (Hamilton et al., 2019), or against the
encroachment of “outsiders” into a particular groups fishing
ground (Pomeroy et al., 2015) without government or legal
backing. Additionally, while there is a need to uphold the diverse
needs, interests and ritual attachments of fishers and fishing
communities, mechanisms that support national-level agency to
meet development aspirations, management responsibilities and
compliance concerns must be considered. A potential solution
to reconcile the national with the local interests lies in co-
management, where the technical, governance and financial
support from governments and or other external agencies are
integrated with the knowledge, lived experience and legitimacy
of local institutions in fishing communities (McWilliam, 2003).
Our case studies of coastal co-management in Timor-Leste
suggest that, despite its relative infancy as a means to regulate
marine resource use, co-management appears to be effective at
engaging communities in resource management which can then
contribute to multiple objectives of national governments, local
communities and also those recognized in the SSF Guidelines
in terms of accessibility and wellbeing. The way in which the
process and ritual of tara bandu has led the development of
co-management illustrates a meaningful interaction between
the customary and contemporary, and between innate and
appropriated cultural practices for fisheries management, as has
been shown elsewhere (e.g., Johannes, 1981; Foale and Manele,
2004; Cohen et al., 2012; Cohen and Steenbergen, 2015). In both
case studies, the importance of strong community institutions
is paramount, but their raison d’ être and drivers of compliance
differ significantly. We explore these drivers, and reflect on the
suitability and sustainability of co-management for governing
coastal fisheries in Timor-Leste.
Drivers of Compliance and Sustainability
The development of local marine management, while supported
by external agencies in both case study communities, was
driven by endogenous perceptions of need or the desire for
change, or a perceived crisis with resource status. Prior to
starting down the pathway toward co-management, community
leaders had voiced concerns about the unsustainable use of
resources. Both communities were guided through participatory
processes that did not have pre-determined donor or government
objectives linked to “recruiting” communities to a pre-defined
management objective or model of management. Nonetheless,
both communities ultimately codified a tara bandu agreement.
In Biacou, the belief in ancestral spirits as the enforcers
of rules drives compliance. In contrast, in Protestant Adara
the support of the church, and the very tangible returns from
tourism taxes drove compliance. Success in community-based
management systems may be attributed to social as well as
ecological dimensions such as fostering a sense of stewardship
and collective self-confidence (Murphree, 2009; Wamukota et al.,
2012). Furthermore, communities may attribute bequest value
to stewarding resources for future generations (O’Garra, 2009),
as might be inferred from Biacou’s desire to reverse perceived
environmental declines. It appears that Adara’s success and
potential sustainability is largely driven by the opportunity
to link resource protection to tourism revenue, and obtain
financial returns to fund communal projects. This happens in a
Protestant community who lived a particular conversion process
by which beliefs in the rai na’in spirits and ancestors are not
part of the contemporary belief system. There is evidence to
suggest that ecological successes of co-management are felt by
community members, and the recognition of the process by the
Pastor is important, but compliance is predominantly driven
by the tangible and rapid accrual of money from tourism to
the closed area.
The history of attempts to encourage tourism in Adara implies
the community was more aware of contemporary opportunities
and we understood these communities to be more accustomed
to external assistance, predisposing them to try new approaches
such as co-management with an explicit goal of encouraging
tourism. Certainly, the levying of a “reef tax” in Adara was a
primary reason given for creating a co-management committee
because this body would be needed to collect and safeguard the
revenue. Yet, Adara and the island of Atauro are exceptions
in terms of opportunities linked to tourism. In Timor-Leste,
tourism is still in its infancy, with international visitor arrivals
the lowest among Southeast Asian nations representing only
0.06% of international visitors in 2016 (UNWTO, 2017). The
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potential for tourism to benefit local livelihoods is not high for
most communities in Timor-Leste, especially on the mainland,
with low visitation rates and high numbers of saltwater crocodiles
(Brackhane et al., 2018) which directly inhibit the potential beach
and dive tourism associated with the development of LMMAs.
Nonetheless, even remote community sites on the mainland are
excited by the economic promise of tourism (WorldFish, unpubl.
data), and may mistakenly identify the implementation of tara
bandu and closed areas as mechanisms to tap into this potential.
Any form of tourism has its inherent vulnerability to political
instability, global financial drivers (Sonmes, 1998), or as seen
recently in Timor-Leste, fickle pricing behavior of airlines. These
will also present new challenges and risks as community members
become increasingly reliant on tourism to supplement incomes.
In contrast to Adara, the sustainability of Biacou’s tara
bandu is not reinforced by financial returns, but rather by
an engaged leadership (both political and ritual), the firm
belief that associated ancestral spirits (rai na’in) can resolve
contemporary problems (i.e., the current presence of a particular
cosmological order), and the belief that current problems
arise from the longstanding disrespect for ritual practices (i.e.,
during Indonesian occupation). The social pressures and fear
of ancestral spirits (rai na’in) appear to be the primary drivers
of compliance. Benefits accrued from management in Biacou
are far less tangible and slower than in Adara; although in
Biacau some fishers anecdotally reported modest improvements
to fisheries. In Biacou, rules were adapted to prohibit gill
netting near the mangroves since the establishment of the
tara bandu, which suggests not only that the legitimacy of
the institution had not been eroded with time, but rather that
regulations could be strengthened despite fewer quantifiable
gains. The increasing education and westernization of youth
in Timor-Leste may threaten the effectiveness of these spiritual
sanctions in controlling behaviors in the longer term. In other
cases, a combination of customary, religious and contemporary
(through state law of the perception of illegality) institutions
have been applied to bolster one with another (Cohen and
Steenbergen, 2015). As contemporary pressures increase, and
customary or local institutions (potentially) erode, the need for
legal or governance bolstering from a relationship with the state
(hierarchical governance) may well increase in Timor Leste, as
has been observed in other countries.
Governance Mechanisms and Processes
The “Fishing for Sustainability” national strategy document
developed for 2006–2011 may have narrowed the view of
tara bandu by suggesting that “community-based fisheries
management initiatives [should aim] at establishing a network
of local, community-supported marine protected areas and
encourage involvement of NGOs” (MAFF, 2005). Yet, a deeper
understanding of tara bandu historically (e.g., Miyazawa, 2013;
Shepherd, 2013) and in the context of these two cases, reinforces
that tara bandu must not be deliberately or unintentionally
confused as a no-take zone, or a method for one. Whilst
the tara bandu CBRM mechanisms implemented in both our
case studies have involved the spatial demarcation of fishing
zones, only Adara incorporated a closed area for the specialized
purpose of protecting a diving area for reef tourists. Tara
bandu can, and should, be considered as a form and process
of local management plan, in being a set of agreed rules
governing the use of resources. Importantly, as illustrated in
depth in other studies (e.g., Miyazawa, 2013; Shepherd, 2013),
tara bandu can act as a framework for appropriate participatory
rule-setting around resources and behaviors; core elements of
both co-management and implementing the SSF Guidelines.
Area closures can form part of management planning where
appropriate (i.e., where benefits from closures exceed the costs
to fishers in terms of lost fishing grounds and lost opportunity
to harvest). However, in most of coastal Timor-Leste, reefs are
narrow so not supportive of high biomass, and the small pelagic
species targeted by fishers (López-Angarita et al., 2019) are highly
mobile, rendering a spatial closure meaningless. Other fisheries
management mechanisms will be more appropriate and effective.
In such instances, the participatory framework provided by the
tara bandu mechanism may still be relevant as a tool for achieving
co-management, but institutions that link local area management
to greater spatial scales such as fisheries extension officers based
in sucos (Figure 2), will be crucial to success.
Tara bandu should not be considered as the only appropriate
mechanism for achieving successful SSF co-management in
Timor-Leste. For example, some sardine fisheries in Timor-Leste
are governed by rules implemented by traditional and suco level
authorities, where they implement gear and size restrictions on
other semi-pelagic fisheries in response to an oversupply of
unmarketable fish (Hunnam, personal communication). In these
instances, tara bandu is not invoked. This suggests there is clear
potential to build SSF co-management on existing customary
and local-level institutions where they exist. However, it should
be at the discretion of the communities and actors involved
whether such co-management mechanisms are underpinned by
tara bandu ritual, or are transparent local-level management rules
backed by formal authorities.
Both our case studies suggest that communities can effectively
manage their local level behaviors and resource exploitation.
However, this does not address concerns about the effectiveness
of controlling the actions of outsiders who may not believe
in the retributive punishment of ancestral spirits, and/or will
not gain from associated monetary benefits. This is common
to other Asian contexts where local compliance increases
with CBRM development, but external or outsider non-
compliance remains pervasive (e.g., Maliao et al., 2009; Nuon
and Gallardo, 2011). Over time, this may lead to increases
in conflicts which can erode the legitimacy of CBRM. To
combat this, literature suggests developing CBRM networks at
a wider special scale to foster cohesive management actions
(Maliao et al., 2009; Gurney et al., 2014). This is an area
where government can play their part in co-management, by
responding to local or municipal level concerns of illegal or
non-compliant fishing activities by outsiders as stipulated in
Environmental Framework Law, Article 8 (the State will ensure
the regulated area is effectively protected). In reality however,
this relies on the General Directorate of Fisheries or the
maritime authority being sufficiently resourced to do so, which
is currently not the case.
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The following section deals with the potential for partners in
co-management to enhance broader compliance beyond the local
community structures. We also discuss if the lack of continued
support and follow up from government/NGO partners is
actually co-management, or rather CBRM in the absence of
decentralized governance.
Management Partners and Motives
Central to developing sustainable co-management systems, is a
meaningful interaction between fishers and fishing communities
and governing institutions at multiple scales (national, municipal,
or suco level). In situations of limited fiscal and human
resources relative to the scale and scope of SSF in Timor-
Leste, external agencies such as the government, NGOs and
development partners may find a legitimate role in attracting
resources, facilitating management and design of institutions,
and brokering new governance connections. However, building
such connections within the dynamic and pluralistic governance
structures of Timor-Leste will require careful design. Experience
from the Pacific suggests that sustained transformations into
CBRM are dependent on building the active support of
communities (Abernethy et al., 2014; Blythe et al., 2017). Active
support can be built by facilitating participatory scoping and
awareness activities, tailoring or adapting rules to fit both
local customary and contemporary practices, and engaging
established governance structures or decision making processes
that are already perceived as being legitimate (Abernethy
et al., 2014). Deficiencies in the facilitation process used, such
as not prioritizing gender considerations, not involving key
stakeholders or not allowing adequate flexibility for community
processes of consensus building, can drive rule-breaking and
may greatly reduce the capacity of the local community
to implement management plans or enforce the rules over
outsiders as well (Pomeroy et al., 2015). In some instances,
CBRM has actually led to increases in resource user conflicts
(Clarke and Jupiter, 2010).
In the Solomon Islands, internal disputes and rule-breaking
were higher at sites that received higher levels of support
from international conservation NGOs, particularly in terms
of management plan facilitation and environmental awareness,
compared to sites in which communities had implemented
fishery management rules with little or no outside NGO support
(Abernethy et al., 2014; Pomeroy et al., 2015). Compliance
and enforcement rates were reported to be higher at these
latter sites. International NGOs have encouraged the equation
by communities of taboos with MPAs to increase their local
acceptability and likelihood of adoption. However, there are
major differences in permanency, size, objectives, legal status,
and design considerations between taboos and MPAs, meaning
that sites designed as both may either not perform the ecological
functions expected of them as MPAs or will not be sufficiently
small or flexible to have minimal negative impacts on community
life (Govan, 2009; Halpern et al., 2010). There is a risk that
international NGOs will not ensure the best fit between local
contexts and how co-management is enshrined in national policy
or approaches (Rohe et al., 2017, 2019).
Our two case studies are, from our experience, relatively
self-mobilized communities, but tara bandu processes were
facilitated by external non-government actors. In parallel
with experience in the Pacific (e.g., Léopold et al., 2013),
development and conservation agencies in Timor-Leste have
looked for opportunities for more effective interventions by
drawing on existing, albeit eroded, traditions such as tara bandu
(Shepherd, 2009). Such agencies may work to elicit the “right”
behaviors derived from a world view often unaligned with
local understandings (Shepherd, 2004) and at times in direct
opposition to local needs – notably food and nutrition security.
A thin veneer of participatory language may hide an approach
that in reality is more akin to telling participants exactly how,
and in what, they are to participate, and selling the potential
gains to full participation. As such, the true extent of political
will and self-mobilization can be hard to discern for anyone
outside of these processes. Tara bandu revival has been actively
endorsed and encouraged by NGOs and development partners in
Timor-Leste since independence (Miyazawa, 2013), driven on the
one hand by the desire to protect marine areas by conservation
NGOs, and on the other by the need to build on local strengths
given the insufficient financial or human capacity to enforce
more formal top–down methods of management. The very small
scale of fisheries and communities imply they are predisposed
to being cohesive, with elected suco leaders, which may enhance
their capacity to govern their resources in spite of complex and
pluralistic rule structures.
The combination of suco level governance and ritual beliefs
related to tara bandu compliments the responsibilities and duties
allocated to the suco councils. Suco councils are intended to
represent the interests of community members. However, given
the hybridized nature of governance in Timor-Leste, they may
simply reflect customary power hierarchies, and hence may
reproduce and reinforce existing inequities. This “elite capture,”
where control of resources by influential individuals reduces
incomes and access rights of poor fishers (Khan et al., 2012),
may be at play in Biacou, where “. . .three households belonging
to Biacou’s founding lineage showed a disproportionately high
fishing capacity. The community’s customary and administrative
leadership at the time of research centered on these same
households. While the average household boat ownership in
Biacou was one boat per household, each of these households
owned at least four boats” (Steenbergen et al., in review). In
the same vein, the co-management committees provided for in
Timor-Leste’s Fisheries Law Decree (6/2004, Article 114), may
also merely reflect traditional village hierarchies. Governance
decisions must rely on connections formed through the Suco
council, but at the same time take into account community
structure, power inequities and cultural nuances to avoid
reinforcing elite capture.
Fishers are often the most vulnerable and marginalized
people within a community, stuck in social-ecological traps
where fishing is a last resort and high dependence can
drive overexploitation (Cinner et al., 2008; Cinner, 2011;
Cole et al., 2018). In these cases, the establishment of
protected areas can exacerbate marginalization and poverty,
especially amongst minorities (Christie, 2004; West et al., 2006;
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Charles et al., 2016). Similarly, women’s gleaning activities, which
are often conducted close to communities when time is
available between home duties, are particularly susceptible
to exclusion through closed areas. Despite the small size of
the closed area in the Adara case study (0.04 km2), this
may still have had significant consequences on certain sectors
of the fishery such as women gleaners, had they not been
active participants in the design process. The promise of co-
management is that by integrating voices from government
and civil society (e.g., resource user groups, like fishers)
in decision-making processes, the balancing of social and
ecological sustainability objectives captured in the SSF Guidelines
can be achieved.
The diverse nature of tropical reef fisheries implies they
are among the most difficult to manage (Gutiérrez et al.,
2011). Timor-Leste’s SSF are predominantly non-mechanized and
nearshore with limited large pelagic species targeted, making
the focus of management very much on nearshore ecosystems.
Land tenure, particularly the interaction of customary and
contemporary tenure, is a work in progress in Timor-Leste.
Customary marine tenure is even more loosely defined;
boundaries may extend seaward from acknowledged land
boundary markers (McWilliam, 2003) or relate to broad
habitat types rather than to specific distances or geographical
points. Ostrom (1990) highlighted the importance of clearly
defined boundaries as a basis for co-management and this has
been observed throughout the Pacific Islands, although such
boundaries are often de facto, based on customary practice
and not necessarily legally recognized (Govan, 2009). The
important point is that resource managers (communities and
government) are clear about which resources are being co-
managed and therefore who the prime beneficiaries are. In
Adara, in the absence of any formal enforcement by the
government, the community takes it under their own authority
to guard “their” resources against fishing by other communities
on reefs and around fish FADs. The sustainability of co-
management in these settings may rely on investment by
government or external partners in recording traditionally
recognized boundaries or locally acceptable marine extensions
of the terrestrial aldeia and Suco boundaries (Alonso et al.,
2012). The establishment and initial successes of the Adara
LMMA has promoted the grass-roots growth of CBRM
among Atauro Island communities. Other communities have
since self-mobilized to establish SSF regulations and no-
take LMMAs, or have reached out to NGOs for assistance
with the co-management process. However, the converse
is also occurring where well-resources external actors have
used such initial success to aggressively push tara bandu as
a mechanism to achieve externally derived objectives with
insufficient resources or time given for local engagement,
consultative gender-aware rule development, and understanding
context. This emphasizes the need for knowledge exchange
and the establishment of best practice, to strengthen the
capacity and resilience of communities and leaders to engage
with external agents and retain use rights (that enable
stewardship), and strengthen the capacity of government to
ensure legitimate process.
Effectively delivering the government contributions to co-
management presents logistical challenges which may potentially
be offset by decentralized institutional structures in Timor-Leste
such as the municipal MAF offices (Figure 2). Decentralized
approaches can enhance the resilience of the social-ecological
system by being flexible and adaptive (Folke et al., 2005;
Armitage et al., 2009) and can carry out simple and cost-
effective co-management activities that support CBRM, such
as identifying problems, facilitating lesson sharing between
communities, facilitating agreement of rules, and sustaining
community action (Govan et al., 2011; Govan, 2013). However,
the capacity of Timor-Leste’s government to structure and
initiate decentralized environmental legislation is constrained by
a lack of financial, technical and human resources, professional
training and judiciary and public awareness of environmental
laws. Furthermore, imposing an additional level of formalized
governance onto the existing local institutional governance adds
substantial complexity (Cummins and Leach, 2012), and it should
be kept in mind that as governance becomes more decentralized,
there is a risk that some people will be further marginalized
or disadvantaged, due to potentially reinforcing local power
hierarchies with formal governance.
In conclusion, the case-studies and analysis presented here
suggest that self-governance persists in Timor-Leste and is
implemented and relevant for fisheries management of nearshore
coastal resources at limited scales, by building on locally
legitimate institutions. Co-management can operate in Timor-
Leste, by utilizing or interacting with these customary, legal
and religious institutions of self-governance, while at the
same time leveraging hierarchical governance mechanisms
to manage larger scale fisheries challenges. Currently, the
intermediary role of fisheries officers in escalating issues of
(e.g.) outside encroachment is undefined, and the capacity
for MAF to respond is very limited. Tara bandu is clearly a
valuable institution for the development of local rules, and for
facilitating engagement of resource owners and stakeholders
in multi-scale governance, but must be supplemented by
contextually-derived approaches and institutional architecture
appropriate to managing important mobile fisheries resources
(such as small pelagic species) at scales larger than community
fishing areas. It is timely, following the example of Pacific
countries, to design a set of best practices and principles
to ensure legitimate community engagement (considering
needs and aspirations, gender, and power inequities). These
should be defined with some urgency and upheld by central
government. The current reliance on external development
partners and NGOs, while necessary, must be supplemented
by a structured and well-coordinated program of capacity
development that seeks to ensure sustainability of investments in
governance and management.
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